George Almost Confesses
America went to war in Iraq in order to create a client state backed by a long-term U.S. military presence. After 4 years of conflict, after all of the deception about weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein's involvement in 9-11 and the threat Al Qaeda poses to the American mainland, Mr. Bush's post-Petraeus speech finally came close to a confession: the reason the US invaded Iraq was to transfer the protective forces of the American military from Saudi Arabia to a more hospitable, permanent location.
American protection of the Saudi royal family goes back to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The presence of the American military on Saudi soil was augmented during and after the first Persian Gulf War in 1990. Reflecting the long-standing American commitment to the security of the kingdom and the intimate business ties between Saudi rulers and the Bush family, the existence of the US base in Saudi Arabia was considered a profound sacrilege by a range of Islamic authorities in the region. By the mid-1990s, the American presence provided a key justification to Osama bin Laden and other Islamic radicals clamoring to overthrow the Saudi monarchy.
As American strategic planners looked at all of the possible scenarios that could develop in the volatile Middle East, the prospect of a Saudi overthrow clearly had the gravest implications for the U.S. and for the global economy. After 19 American servicemen were killed in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996 and bombings in Riyadh began targeting American personnel between 2000 and 2003, the redeployment of the US military became a more pressing tactical consideration. After 9-11, it became an opportunity. Yet, a precipitous move out of Saudi Arabia would have been politically unacceptable because it would have burnished the heroic credentials of Osama bin Laden in the Arab world, giving him the victory he had long sought – the removal of infidel American troops from the holiest spot in Islam.
That the move into Iraq was in the interest of the Saudi royal family was undeniable. Transferring the American military presence would have, in theory, diluted the threat bin Laden posed to the kingdom while maintaining a sufficient level of insurance nearby for the guardians of the world's most important energy reserve. It would also have established a strategic buffer between the Saudis and the growing threat posed by Shiite Iran. That was the theory. It all seemed to make sense.
What the American strategists didn't plan on was that the innate lack of political cohesion in Iraq would make it impossible to build a unified, client government out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein's regime. The nation builders in the Bush Administration didn't bother to take the time to read the region. The modern states of the Arab world are all creations of the west. Held together by autocratic ethnic, religious or military rulers, they are imposed geographical entities, arbitrarily constituted by Britain, France and the United States after the Ottoman Empire was dissolved in the wake of the First World War. For hundreds of years, the region had been a collection of ethnic factions and religious clans, often in contention with each other and dominated by foreign powers. That the residents of a manufactured, multi-ethnic state like Iraq would, upon its dissolution, revert back to tribal behavior should not have been surprising to anyone who had read history or had observed conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda and elsewhere. Yet, the lesson seemed to be lost on American policy planners.
What is now clear is that the presence of American troops in Iraq is the problem, just like it was in Saudi Arabia. It has been a key catalyst in what has become that country's civil war. The conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites and between the Persians and the Arabs are over a thousand years old, and are not subject to the instant solutions characteristic of an American mindset. Now the US is trapped, a victim of its meddling and deceitful leadership, watching its sons and daughters die while an incompetent president and an impotent Congress argue hopelessly.
The disgust that the American public feels towards its leaders is a result of the absurd choice that Mr. Bush's war has presented: we dare not go and we cannot afford to stay. Saying that the only way to honor the sacrifice of American war casualties in Iraq is to make more of them, fearful of the chaos that could ensue upon the military's departure, Mr. Bush has reaffirmed his intent to maintain the American presence long-term - his intent from the beginning.
Somewhere in the comforts of Riyadh, the Saudi rulers are probably smiling. The last official US Air Force unit left the county in November, 2003. According to the plans of those in the White House and some Congressional Republicans, it will be 2053 before American forces leave Iraq. Perhaps at some point between now and the next round of US elections the American people, strongly opposed to our involvement in an ongoing civil war, might find a way to get the message to its elected leaders: it's time to pull out; leave the citizens of Iraq alone; let them fight in peace.
Paul Schwartz is a writer and editor whose work has been carried by the Pacific News Service, the Environmental News Network and publications in Europe. Blog at: thenextreport.blogspot.com
America went to war in Iraq in order to create a client state backed by a long-term U.S. military presence. After 4 years of conflict, after all of the deception about weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein's involvement in 9-11 and the threat Al Qaeda poses to the American mainland, Mr. Bush's post-Petraeus speech finally came close to a confession: the reason the US invaded Iraq was to transfer the protective forces of the American military from Saudi Arabia to a more hospitable, permanent location.
American protection of the Saudi royal family goes back to the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The presence of the American military on Saudi soil was augmented during and after the first Persian Gulf War in 1990. Reflecting the long-standing American commitment to the security of the kingdom and the intimate business ties between Saudi rulers and the Bush family, the existence of the US base in Saudi Arabia was considered a profound sacrilege by a range of Islamic authorities in the region. By the mid-1990s, the American presence provided a key justification to Osama bin Laden and other Islamic radicals clamoring to overthrow the Saudi monarchy.
As American strategic planners looked at all of the possible scenarios that could develop in the volatile Middle East, the prospect of a Saudi overthrow clearly had the gravest implications for the U.S. and for the global economy. After 19 American servicemen were killed in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996 and bombings in Riyadh began targeting American personnel between 2000 and 2003, the redeployment of the US military became a more pressing tactical consideration. After 9-11, it became an opportunity. Yet, a precipitous move out of Saudi Arabia would have been politically unacceptable because it would have burnished the heroic credentials of Osama bin Laden in the Arab world, giving him the victory he had long sought – the removal of infidel American troops from the holiest spot in Islam.
That the move into Iraq was in the interest of the Saudi royal family was undeniable. Transferring the American military presence would have, in theory, diluted the threat bin Laden posed to the kingdom while maintaining a sufficient level of insurance nearby for the guardians of the world's most important energy reserve. It would also have established a strategic buffer between the Saudis and the growing threat posed by Shiite Iran. That was the theory. It all seemed to make sense.
What the American strategists didn't plan on was that the innate lack of political cohesion in Iraq would make it impossible to build a unified, client government out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein's regime. The nation builders in the Bush Administration didn't bother to take the time to read the region. The modern states of the Arab world are all creations of the west. Held together by autocratic ethnic, religious or military rulers, they are imposed geographical entities, arbitrarily constituted by Britain, France and the United States after the Ottoman Empire was dissolved in the wake of the First World War. For hundreds of years, the region had been a collection of ethnic factions and religious clans, often in contention with each other and dominated by foreign powers. That the residents of a manufactured, multi-ethnic state like Iraq would, upon its dissolution, revert back to tribal behavior should not have been surprising to anyone who had read history or had observed conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda and elsewhere. Yet, the lesson seemed to be lost on American policy planners.
What is now clear is that the presence of American troops in Iraq is the problem, just like it was in Saudi Arabia. It has been a key catalyst in what has become that country's civil war. The conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites and between the Persians and the Arabs are over a thousand years old, and are not subject to the instant solutions characteristic of an American mindset. Now the US is trapped, a victim of its meddling and deceitful leadership, watching its sons and daughters die while an incompetent president and an impotent Congress argue hopelessly.
The disgust that the American public feels towards its leaders is a result of the absurd choice that Mr. Bush's war has presented: we dare not go and we cannot afford to stay. Saying that the only way to honor the sacrifice of American war casualties in Iraq is to make more of them, fearful of the chaos that could ensue upon the military's departure, Mr. Bush has reaffirmed his intent to maintain the American presence long-term - his intent from the beginning.
Somewhere in the comforts of Riyadh, the Saudi rulers are probably smiling. The last official US Air Force unit left the county in November, 2003. According to the plans of those in the White House and some Congressional Republicans, it will be 2053 before American forces leave Iraq. Perhaps at some point between now and the next round of US elections the American people, strongly opposed to our involvement in an ongoing civil war, might find a way to get the message to its elected leaders: it's time to pull out; leave the citizens of Iraq alone; let them fight in peace.
Paul Schwartz is a writer and editor whose work has been carried by the Pacific News Service, the Environmental News Network and publications in Europe. Blog at: thenextreport.blogspot.com
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